

In re Lewis Edward Graham, Case No. 07-62339-fra11

10/17/2008 FRA

Unpublished

Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition on July 9, 2007, to which a creditor objected on the grounds that Debtor did not qualify for chapter 13 relief under Code § 109(e) and that the petition was filed in bad faith. The bankruptcy was thereafter dismissed on Debtor's motion. Debtor filed a second bankruptcy case, under chapter 11, on August 19, 2007.

Because Debtor's second case was filed within one year of a previous case which was pending during that period but dismissed, the automatic stay would terminate 30 days after the petition date, Code § 362(c)(3)(A), unless a party in interest moved to extend the stay. Code § 362(c)(3)(B). The Debtor moved to extend the stay, a hearing was held, and the Court denied the motion.

A creditor with both secured and unsecured claims against the Debtor filed a "Motion for Order Confirming Automatic Stay is Not in Effect" under Code § 362(j). The aim of the motion was to determine the effect of the court's previous order declining to extend the automatic stay. At the hearing on the motion, the creditor argued that the Court should adopt the "minority" position that the stay was terminated at the end of the 30-day period in its entirety. The Court, however, adopted the "majority" position in ruling that Code § 362(c)(3)(A) is unambiguous and that the stay is terminated at the end of the 30-day period only with respect to the debtor and property of the debtor, not as to property of the estate. Moreover, the stay is only terminated with respect to an "action" taken by a creditor pre-petition. As the moving party had no action pending against the Debtor or property of the Debtor at the petition date, it could enforce its state law rights only with leave of the Bankruptcy Court under Code § 362(d).

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

In Re: ) Bankruptcy Case  
LEWIS EDWARD GRAHAM, II, ) No. 07-62339-fra11  
Debtor. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Grand Pacific Financing Corp. ("GPFC") filed a motion under § 362(j)<sup>1</sup> seeking an order confirming that the automatic stay of § 362(a) has been terminated. At issue is the effect of an order terminating the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3)(A), which provision was added as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"). GPFC and the Debtor filed memoranda arguing their respective positions. A hearing was held on October 7, 2008, at the conclusion of which, the matter was taken under advisement.

// // //  
// // //

---

<sup>1</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. §101 *et seq.*



1  
2 DISCUSSION

3 Section 362(c) (3) provides in relevant part:

4 (3) if a single or joint case is filed by or against  
5 debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11,  
6 or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was  
7 pending within the preceding 1-year period but was  
8 dismissed, other than a case refiled under a chapter other  
9 than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b)--

10 (A) the stay under subsection (a) **with respect to any**  
11 **action taken** with respect to a debt or property securing  
12 such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate  
13 **with respect to the debtor** on the 30th day after the  
14 filing of the later case;

15 (B) on the motion of a party in interest for  
16 continuation of the automatic stay and upon notice and a  
17 hearing, the court may extend the stay in particular cases  
18 as to any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or  
19 limitations as the court may impose) after notice and a  
20 hearing completed before the expiration of the 30-day  
21 period only if the party in interest demonstrates that the  
22 filing of the later case is in good faith as to the  
23 creditors to be stayed; [Emphasis added].

24 Actions Subject to Stay Termination

25 As mentioned previously, the Court declined to extend the  
26 automatic stay after notice and a hearing held on September 17, 2007.  
27 GPFC urges the Court to adopt the minority position regarding the extent  
28 of the stay termination, and rule that § 362(c) (3) (A) terminated the stay  
29 in its entirety. See e.g. *In re Curry*, 362 B.R. 394, 400-02 (Bankr.  
30 N.D.Ill. 2007), *In re Jupiter*, 344 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006).  
31 These courts have ruled that the language of § 362(c) (3) (A) is ambiguous,  
32 i.e. is capable of more than one interpretation, that legislative history  
33 indicates that Congress intended the automatic stay to terminate in its  
34 entirety, and that interpreting the statute in this manner is consistent

1 with other provisions added by BAPCPA and with the broader context of the  
2 statute as a whole. These courts find that the phrase "with respect to  
3 the debtor," defines not the property for which stay protection is  
4 terminated, but *which* debtor is affected by stay termination. The  
5 example given is a joint bankruptcy case where only one of the co-debtors  
6 had a case dismissed within the previous year. See *In re Jupiter* at 759-  
7 60. The automatic stay would remain in place respecting the other co-  
8 debtor.

9 Debtor, on the other hand, urges the Court to adopt the position  
10 of the majority of courts confronted with this issue which holds that  
11 there is no ambiguity in the statute, and that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates  
12 the stay with respect to the debtor and property of the debtor, but not  
13 property of the estate. See *e.g. In re Jumpp*, 356 B.R. 789 (BAP 1st Cir.  
14 2006), *In re Holcomb*, 380 B.R. 813 (BAP 10th Cir. 2008). As indicated in  
15 *Holcomb*, these courts reason that if Congress meant to terminate the stay  
16 in its entirety, it could have done so in plain language, as it did in §  
17 362(c)(4)(A)(i)<sup>2</sup>.

18 I find that the better approach is the one taken by the majority  
19 of courts that have ruled on this issue, and hold that § 362(c)(3)(A)  
20 terminates the automatic stay with respect to the debtor and property of  
21 the debtor, but leaves the stay in place respecting property of the  
22

---

23 <sup>2</sup>This section reads: "if a single or joint case is filed by or  
24 against a debtor who is an individual under this title, and if 2 or more  
25 single or joint cases of the debtor were pending within the previous year  
26 but were dismissed . . . , the stay under subsection (a) shall not go  
into effect upon the filing of the later case." This language clearly  
refers to the automatic stay in its entirety. *In re Nelson*, 391 B.R. 437,  
449 (9th Cir. BAP 2008).

1 estate. In making this holding, I adopt the rationale of the Panel in  
2 *Holcomb* in finding that there is no ambiguity in the language of the  
3 statute and that reading the statute in accordance with its plain meaning  
4 is consistent with the policies of the Bankruptcy Code. *Holcomb* at 816.

5 "With Respect to Any Action Taken"

6 Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay at the end of the 30-day  
7 period "with respect to any action taken" regarding a debt or property  
8 securing such debt or regarding a lease. In *In re Paschal*, 337 B.R. 274  
9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006), the court compared the term "act" found in  
10 sections 362(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) with the term "action"  
11 found in § 362(a)(1), in various subsections of § 362(b) and at §  
12 362(c)(3)(C)(ii). From that comparison, it determined that the term  
13 "action," as used in § 362(c)(3)(A) refers to a "formal action, such as a  
14 judicial, administrative, governmental, quasi-judicial, or other  
15 essentially formal activity or proceeding." Moreover, because the section  
16 refers to "action taken," it follows that the action referred to must  
17 have occurred pre-petition. *Id.* at 280. That the action must have been  
18 taken pre-petition also follows from the fact that an action taken post-  
19 petition (i.e. during the 30 days after the petition date when the  
20 automatic stay is in effect) would be void *ab initio*. *In re Schwartz*, 954  
21 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992). The Paschal court concluded that §  
22 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only with regard to an action  
23 taken by a party prior to the petition date. Paschal at 280-81. The  
24 holding in Paschal is well reasoned and is hereby adopted by this Court.

25 // // //

26 // // //

