

11 USC § 524 (i)
11 USC § 1322(b) (2)
11 USC § 1322(b) (5)
11 USC § 1322(b) (11)
11 USC § 1322(e)
11 USC § 1325
General Order 97-1.4(b)
General Order 98-1
LBR 3015-1.B.9

In Re Lee and Amanda Anderson Main Case # 07-60532-aer13
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Two creditors secured solely in the Debtors' residence objected to various provisions in Debtors' Chapter 13 plan which directed how plan payments must be accounted for, defined the ambit and procedures for allowance of "arrearage" claims, and established certain remedies for failure to properly account for payments.

The court first held that § 524(i) (a BAPCPA provision giving a debtor a remedy for a creditor's willful failure to credit plan payments to the debtor's material injury), did not provide an independent basis for inserting plan language; rather a plan was to be measured by that which was allowed by §§ 1322 and 1325.

The court went on to analyze the contested provisions holding the great majority were either surplusage or otherwise inappropriate. In particular, the court noted Debtors could not define the universe of what constituted an "arrearage" or "cure," as § 1322(e) controlled that calculation. The opinion sets out the contested provisions verbatim followed by the court's analysis. The court did hold that a provision requiring notice to the trustee and Debtors' counsel (in addition to the Debtors) of changes in the tax and insurance escrow account set up with their home mortgage did not inappropriately modify the creditor's rights.

Because of Debtors' main aims was to be assured there were no surprises as to the status of the home mortgages when they completed their plan, the court suggested that a plan provision extending the procedures set out in General Order 97-1 (as amended by General Order 98-1) to all arrearage amounts (pre and post petition) including all fees and costs, might be appropriate. It also noted language approved in other cases within this District addressing certain accounting issues with regard to home mortgages.

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

In Re:) Bankruptcy Case
) No. 07-60532-aer13
LEE MICHAEL ANDERSON and)
AMANDA BETH ANDERSON,) AMENDED
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
)
)
) Debtors.)

This matter comes before the court on objections to confirmation of Debtors' Chapter 13 plan filed by secured creditors Citifinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. (Citifinancial) and Umpqua Bank (Umpqua) (collectively "the home lenders"). The objections are to plan paragraphs relating to treatment of the home lenders' claims. The matter has been briefed and is ripe for decision.

Background:

Lee and Amanda Anderson (Debtors) filed their Chapter 13 petition on March 2, 2007. Their Chapter 13 plan is dated March 16, 2007. They propose a \$500/month payment to the chapter 13 trustee (trustee) in ¶ 1. The home lenders are secured solely in Debtors' principal residence

1 located in Klamath Falls, Oregon.¹ Both lenders are treated in plan
2 ¶ 2(b)(1) as to pre-petition arrears. Debtors estimate the pre-petition
3 arrearage for each at \$1,500,² which they propose the trustee pay at
4 \$100/month³ at 0% interest. In plan ¶ 4, Debtors propose to pay the
5 regular monthly mortgage payments due post-petition directly to the home
6 lenders. Plan ¶¶ 13-17 and "6"[sic]⁴ are the contested paragraphs, which
7 are discussed below.⁵

8 Applicable Bankruptcy Code Sections, Local Rules and Orders:

9 Before discussing the contested paragraphs, it is beneficial to
10 review the Bankruptcy Code sections, local procedural rules and orders
11 which are applicable to the matters at bar.

12 Bankruptcy Code Sections:⁶

13 Section 524(i), a creature of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
14 Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),⁷ gives a remedy to debtors
15 against a creditor who willfully fails to credit plan payments to the

17 ¹ Both home lenders' claims are evidenced by promissory notes and trust deeds.

18 ² Umpqua's amended proof of claim indicates a \$1,609.35 pre-petition arrearage; Citifinancial's proof of
19 claim indicates a \$1,482.72 pre-petition arrearage.

20 ³ Plan ¶ 2(b)(4) proposes that the trustee pay \$1,500 in remaining attorney's fees before all other creditors.

21 ⁴ Plan ¶ "6" should have been numbered "18."

22 ⁵ The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon requires that all Chapter 13 plans be submitted on Local
23 Form #1300.5. Paragraphs ##1-11 thereof are largely boilerplate. Some paragraphs have blanks to be filled in with
24 particulars as to the debtor's payment obligations and creditor treatment. Debtors may also add paragraphs to
supplement the boilerplate. The contested paragraphs are such supplemental terms.

25 ⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to Title 11 of the United States Code.

26 ⁷ Pub. L. 109-8, April 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 23. Most of BAPCPA's provisions, including § 524(i) were
effective for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.

1 debtors' material injury. The section treats such failure as a violation
2 of the discharge injunction, and perhaps counter-intuitively, bases the
3 remedy on the creditor's actions prior to the discharge.⁸ Section 524(i)
4 provides:

5 The willful failure of a creditor to credit payments
6 received under a plan confirmed under this title, unless
7 the order confirming the plan is revoked, the plan is in
8 default, or the creditor has not received payments
9 required to be made under the plan in the manner required
10 by the plan (including crediting the amounts required
11 under the plan), shall constitute a violation of an
12 injunction under subsection (a)(2) if the act of the
13 creditor to collect and failure to credit payments in the
14 manner required by the plan caused material injury to the
15 debtor.

16 Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits tampering with a lender's "rights,"
17 if the lender is secured solely in real property which is the debtor's
18 principal residence.⁹ It provides:

19 Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section,
20 the plan may-
21 modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than
22 a claim secured only by a security interest in real
23 property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of
24 holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the
25 rights of holders of any class of claims.¹⁰

26 ⁸ A debtor's remedy for violation of the discharge injunction is civil contempt. Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 2002).

⁹ In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329-330, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2110, 124 L. Ed.2d 228 (1993) the court held § 1322(b)(2)'s emphasis is on protecting the creditor's "rights," (as opposed to its "claim"), as reflected in the relevant mortgage instruments and nonbankruptcy law. The court however noted these rights could be infringed by other sections of the Bankruptcy Code independent of § 1322(b)(2) (e.g. the automatic stay of § 362). Id.

¹⁰ The § 1322(c)(2) exception to anti-modification when the mortgage debt by its (non-accelerated) terms becomes due before the final plan payment is due, does not apply here.

1 Section 1322(b) (5) is an exception to § 1322(b) (2)'s anti-
2 modification language. It allows for "cure" of defaults and maintenance
3 of regularly scheduled payments on long term debt. It provides:

4 Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section,
5 the plan may-
6 notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide
7 for the curing of any default¹¹ within a reasonable time
8 and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on
9 any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last
10 payment is due after the date on which the final payment
11 under the plan is due.

12 Section 1322(e) directs that the amount of a "cure" is determined
13 by the underlying agreement and nonbankruptcy law, as follows:

14 Notwithstanding subsection (b) (2) of this section
15 and sections 506(b) and 1325(a) (5) of this title, if it is
16 proposed in a plan to cure a default, the amount necessary
17 to cure the default, shall be determined in accordance
18 with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy
19 law.

20 Section 1322(b) (11) is a "catch all" as to permissible plan
21 provisions. It provides:

22 Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section,
23 the plan may-include any other appropriate provision not
24 inconsistent with this title.

25 Section 1325(a) (1) is a confirmation requirement which provides:

26 Except as provided in subsection (b), the court
shall confirm a plan if- the plan complies with the
provisions of this chapter and with the other applicable
provisions of this title.

Local Rules and General Orders:

¹¹ "Any default" within the statute means that even post-confirmation defaults can be cured through the vehicle of a Chapter 13 plan. In re McCollum, 76 B.R. 797, 800-801 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987).

1 Most promissory notes and trust deeds (or mortgages) securing
2 them, have provisions allowing for imposition of fees and costs relating
3 to either the note's collection or the security's protection. The
4 Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon's General Order (G.O.) 97-1
5 (as amended by G.O. 98-1) addresses some of these fees and costs. It
6 gives secured creditors a choice to claim attorney's fees and costs in a
7 proof of claim and have them paid by the Chapter 13 trustee as part of
8 the cure of the debtor's default or simply give the debtor notice of
9 these costs, without payment by the trustee. A creditor may elect to
10 include some fees and costs in its proof of claim and make simple
11 disclosure as to others. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (2).

12 If a secured creditor wants its pre-petition attorneys' fees and
13 costs paid by the trustee, it must include and identify them in its
14 initial proof of claim. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (1) (A). Post-petition, pre-
15 confirmation fees and costs must be included and identified either in the
16 initial proof of claim or in an amended proof of claim filed within 30
17 days of the confirmation order. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (1) (B) as amended by G.O.
18 98-1.6. Post-confirmation fees and costs must be included in an amended
19 proof of claim filed at least 90 days prior to the date the debtor is
20 scheduled to make the final plan payment. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (1) (c) as
21 amended by G.O. 98-1.6.

22 If the creditor does not want the trustee to pay the fees and
23 costs, it may file a proof of claim identifying the fees and costs
24 (presumably with a notation not to pay them) or give the debtor written
25 notice of the fees and costs. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (2). If notice is given, it
26 shall state the right to such fees and costs, that payment by the trustee

1 is not requested, the amount of the claim to the extent then known, and
2 the interest rate charged on any accrued fees and costs. G.O. 97-
3 1.4(b) (2) (A). For pre-petition fees and costs, the disclosure deadline
4 is the proof of claim deadline. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (2) (B). For post-petition
5 fees and costs, the deadline is the date at least 90 days before the
6 debtor is scheduled to make the final plan payment.

7 Interested parties may request a written itemization of any fees
8 and costs to the extent not provided in a proof of claim. G.O. 97-
9 1.4(b) (3). The creditor must provide the itemization within 30 days of
10 the request. Id.

11 Whether notice is given or payment is requested via a proof of
12 claim, a party in interest must file any objection to the fees and costs
13 at least 60 days prior to the date the debtor is scheduled to make the
14 final plan payment. G.O. 97-1.4(b) (4). The 60 day deadline does not
15 preclude the court from *sua sponte* considering the reasonableness of the
16 fees. Id.

17 Finally, G.O. 97-1.4(b) (5) provides that a debtor who completes
18 his plan payments and obtains a discharge shall be deemed to have cured
19 any obligation owed to a secured creditor for fees and costs incurred no
20 later than 120 days prior to the last scheduled plan payment, unless the
21 secured creditor has disclosed the intent to preserve such a claim per
22 the notice procedure discussed above.

23 Local Bankruptcy Rule (LBR) 3015-1.B.9 protects a creditor from
24 automatic stay violations in servicing home mortgage maintenance payments
25 under a Chapter 13 plan. Under LBR 3015-1.B.9, if a plan provides that
26 the debtor will directly pay the regular home mortgage payments coming

1 due post-petition, "the debtor will be deemed to have authorized the
2 affected creditor to continue automatic withdrawals of payments
3 postpetition, if authorized prepetition, and to mail to the debtor: (1)
4 coupon books; (2) notices regarding payment changes; and (3) account
5 statements."

6 Discussion:

7 In summary, the contested paragraphs direct how plan payments to
8 the home lenders must be accounted for, define the ambit and procedures
9 for allowance of "arrearage" claims, and establish certain remedies for
10 failure to properly account for payments. Debtors argue the contested
11 paragraphs are necessary to implement § 524(i). They argue § 524(i) is
12 not self-executing, the plan must detail how the home lenders are to
13 credit the payments received. They contend that to the extent this may
14 conflict with preservation of the lenders' "rights," § 524(i) "trumps"
15 § 1322(b)(2). The only court to consider this issue rejected these
16 arguments, stating, after examining the statute's text and legislative
17 history:

18 This subsection does not provide a basis for the
19 incorporation of proposed language in a Chapter 13 plan.
20 Instead, it merely provides debtors a potential remedy,
21 post-discharge, if a creditor has failed to honor the
terms of a confirmed plan by not properly crediting
payments received as required by the plan.

22 In re Collins, 2007 WL 2116416, *4 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2007). This court
23 agrees with the Collins court. Section 524(i) provides a remedy. It
24 does not dictate what is permissible under a Chapter 13 plan. Rather,
25 that task is governed by §§ 1322 and 1325. The contested paragraphs
26 should be measured against those sections. The court does so below,

1 setting the paragraphs out verbatim (in indented *italic* text), along with
2 the court's analysis.

3 Contested Paragraphs:¹²

4 **¶ 13. Application of Postpetition Ongoing**
5 **Installment Payments Made by Debtors.** *The*
6 *ongoing postpetition installment payments on*
7 *the Debtors' home mortgaged [sic] will be paid*
8 *by the Debtors directly to Citifinancial*
9 *Mortgage and to Umpqua Bank, beginning with*
10 *the payment due on April 1, 2007.*

11 This provision is surplusage. The boilerplate in plan ¶ 4
12 already provides that Debtors will directly pay the regular payments due
13 postpetition in accordance with the terms of the respective contracts.
14 The April 1, 2007 payment was the first payment due post-petition, and
15 does not have to be so specified.

16 *The payments received by Citifinancial and/or*
17 *Umpqua Bank from the Debtors for ongoing*
18 *postpetition installment payments shall be*
19 *applied and credited to the Debtors' mortgage*
20 *accountd [sic] as if the account were current*
21 *and no prepetition defaults existed on the*
22 *petition date*

23 This provision is ambiguous. Debtors' intent is that the post-
24 petition maintenance payments be accounted for as if there was no pre-
25 petition default (the arrearage being paid separately through the
26 trustee). If it simply said that, the provision might pass muster. See,
In re Wines, 239 B.R. 703, 707 (Bankr. D. Id. 1999). However, it adds
language that the payments are to be applied and credited as "if the

¹² The contested paragraphs are borrowed virtually verbatim from sample paragraphs suggested in the article *Challenging Mortgage Servicer 'Junk' Fees and Plan Payment Misapplication: Making Use of New Section 524(i)*, 25 NCLC Reports: Bankruptcy And Foreclosures Ed., Nov./Dec. 2006.

1 accounts were current." If Debtors fall behind in their post-petition
2 maintenance payments, the plan appears to force the home lenders to
3 account for these late payments as current. This would modify their
4 rights in contravention of § 1322(b)(2).

5 *in the order of priority specified in the*
6 *note(s) and security agreement(s) and*
7 *applicable nonbankruptcy law.*

8 This provision is surplusage. The boilerplate in plan ¶ 2(b)
9 provides that "the terms of the debtor's prepetition agreement with each
10 secured creditor shall continue to apply, except as otherwise provided in
11 this plan or in the confirmation order."

12 *If these postpetition installment payments are*
13 *made in a timely manner under the terms of the*
14 *note, they shall be applied and credited*
15 *without penalty.*

16 Debtors defend this clause, arguing that payments to mortgagees
17 by Chapter 13 trustees are often put in "suspense" accounts, to be
18 credited later and assessed a "late fee." However here, the trustee is
19 not making the maintenance payments. Both notes allow for a late charge
20 if the "full" monthly payment is not made within 15 days of the due date
21 (the first of the month). Umpqua's trust deed allows it to accept a
22 (partial) payment which does not bring the loan current, and not apply it
23 (i.e. hold it in a "suspense" account), until enough is later paid to
24 bring the loan current. Thus it's possible, a partial payment in
25 "suspense" which later is credited, could be considered "late" and
26 assessed a late penalty as provided in the note. To the extent the
provision attempts to modify this, it contravenes § 1322(b)(2). To the
extent it simply restates that a full timely payment must be credited

1 without penalty, it is surplusage as the notes already provide for this
2 treatment.

3 **¶ 14. Amount of Postpetition Ongoing**
4 **Installment Payments Made by Debtors.**

5 *Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank shall comply*
6 *with all applicable provisions of the Real*
7 *Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and*
8 *the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) during the*
9 *pendency of this plan,*

10 This provision is surplusage if it accurately states what is
11 required under the notes/trust deeds or nonbankruptcy law. It is
12 "inappropriate" under § 1322(b)(11) if it misstates what is required.
13 Debtors cannot, by fiat, impose law which would otherwise not apply.

14 *and shall make, upon notice to the Debtors,*
15 *Debtors' counsel and the Trustee, appropriate*
16 *adjustments to the ongoing installment payment*
17 *amount(s) to reflect escrow account(s),*
18 *adjustable rate mortgage(s) and other changes*
19 *required by the note(s) and security*
20 *agreement(s).*

21 The home lenders' notes are fixed rate, so the verbiage regarding
22 adjustable rate mortgages is surplusage. The trust deeds require escrows
23 for taxes and insurance, with Debtors paying 1/12 of the annual estimate
24 each month. The requirement is waived in Citifinancial's trust deed if
25 Debtors make such payments to an institutional lienholder in senior
26 position. Umpqua's proof of claim contains an \$80.25 charge for
"Projected Escrow Reserves." Citifinancial's does not. From this, and
Citifinancial's junior position, the court infers no escrow is set up for
the Citifinancial loan,¹³ and thus verbiage relating to its escrow
balances is surplusage.

¹³ There is no reasonable inference that a borrower would have two tax and insurance escrows set up with two separate lenders secured in the same property.

1 Umpqua's trust deed requires notice to Debtors of changes in the
2 escrow amounts required. The plan provision imposes an additional duty
3 to notify Debtors' counsel and the trustee. Umpqua argues this
4 additional notice "modifies" its rights in contravention of
5 § 1322(b)(2). However, additional notice is more in the nature of a
6 procedural requirement to aid Chapter 13 administration, than a
7 modification and is therefore permissible. See, In re Wilson, 321 B.R.
8 222 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); In re Andrews, 2007 WL 2793401 (Bankr. D.
9 Kan. 2007); Collins, supra.¹⁴

10 Umpqua also argues requiring notice would violate the automatic
11 stay. However, plan ¶ 2(b)(1)'s boilerplate incorporates all the terms
12 of Umpqua's underlying note and trust deed, which in turn requires
13 notice. Umpqua has not objected to this boilerplate. In any event, LBR
14 3015-1.B.9 provides for the Debtors' deemed authorization of such
15 notices, and thereby insulates Umpqua from alleged stay violations.

16 *If there is a shortage, deficiency or surplus*
17 *of funds held in escrow, as defined under*
18 *RESPA, during the pendency of this plan,*
19 *Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank shall notify*
20 *the Debtors as required by RESPA, and shall*
21 *also provide notice to Debtors' counsel and*
22 *the Trustee.*

23 The court's discussion immediately above also applies to this
24 provision.

25 **¶ 15. Application of Cure Payments Disbursed**
26 **by Trustee.** *The Debtors will cure the*
default(s) on the mortgage(s) within a
reasonable period of time by making payments
on the arrears through the plan, which

¹⁴ This limited "extra" notice is permitted solely to facilitate administration of the Chapter 13 case. It should not be interpreted as an invitation to require notice to all creditors or other parties in interest.

1 *payments shall be disbursed by the Trustee to*
2 *Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank.*

3 This provision is ambiguous. The term "cure . . . within a
4 reasonable time by making payments" could be construed as a vague and
5 indefinite period with indefinite payment amounts, which conflicts with
6 plan ¶¶ 2(b)(1) and 2(b)(4), which allow for cure at \$100/mo. after
7 attorney's fees are paid. To the extent it doesn't conflict with these
8 paragraphs, it is surplusage. Further, ¶ 2(b)(1) already provides that
9 the trustee will pay the arrears, and as such the remaining language is
10 surplusage.

11 *The payments disbursed by the Trustee to*
12 *Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank shall be*
13 *applied and credited to the amount necessary*
 to cure the default(s), which shall be
 referred to as the "arrears" for the purposes
 of this plan.

14 This provision is surplusage. It is intended to protect Debtors
15 from the home lenders' application of payments meant for the arrears, to
16 other parts of the loan. This rightly assumes the home lenders have an
17 obligation to separately account for the arrears paid by the trustee
18 through ¶ 2(b)(1). See, Nosek v. Ameriquest Mtg. Co. (In re Nosek), 363
19 B.R. 643, 645 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007). That the home lenders must apply
20 the trustee's ¶ 2(b)(1) payments to the arrears is implied however,
21 because plan ¶¶ 2(b)(1) and 4 make clear this is a "cure and maintain"
22 plan and ¶ 2(b)(1) designates that the arrears and only the arrears are
23 what the trustee is paying on the lenders' claims. If the home lenders
24 don't apply these payments to the arrears, they expose themselves to a
25 § 524(i) claim for contempt.
26

1 **¶ 16. Amount of Cure Payments Disbursed by**
2 **Trustee.** The arrears shall consist of the
3 following items, to the extent they are listed
4 and separately itemized on the Citifinancial
5 and/or Umpqua Bank's proof(s) of claim, are
6 reasonable and have been actually incurred,
7 and are authorized and have been properly
8 assessed under the terms of the note and
9 security agreement and applicable
10 nonbankruptcy law:

- 11 a) any unpaid prepetition installment
12 payments due;
13 b) any unpaid prepetition late fees;
14 c) any unpaid prepetition attorney
15 fees;
16 d) any unpaid prepetition fees for
17 services performed in connection with
18 Debtor's prepetition default(s) or for
19 the purpose of protecting
20 Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank's
21 interest in the note and security
22 agreement;
23 (e) any unpaid attorney fees and
24 costs incurred postpetition but prior
25 to confirmation;
26 (f) any prepetition unpaid escrow
 shortage or deficiency, as defined
 under RESPA, to the extent not being
 recovered as part of the unpaid
 prepetition installment payments
 provided in (a) above; and
 (g) any postpetition interest on the
 arrears, if expressly provided for in
 the terms of the note and security
 agreement.

 The amounts required to be paid by the Debtors
 for the above listed items of arrears in order
 to cure the default(s) shall be the amounts
 stated in the Citifinancial and/or Umpqua
 Bank's proof(s) of claim, unless the Debtors
 or Trustee dispute the amount, in which case
 the amount of arrears will be the amount
 ultimately decided by the Court or agreed to
 by the parties.

 Debtors admit this paragraph "spells out what may be in a proof
of claim." Debtors' Opening Memorandum, 18th page (unnumbered). A plan
is the wrong place to do this. Further, Debtors cannot define the

1 universe of what constitutes "arrears." That definition is provided by
2 § 1322(e), which incorporates the parties' agreements and nonbankruptcy
3 law.¹⁵ Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mtg. Co. (In Re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227,
4 231 (9th Cir. B.A.P. (Nev.) 2003). To the extent plan ¶ 16 diverges from
5 § 1322(e) (and the underlying agreements and nonbankruptcy law), it is
6 "inappropriate" under § 1322(b)(11). To the extent it reiterates the
7 parties' agreements and nonbankruptcy law, it is surplusage. To the
8 extent it requires that pre-petition, and post-petition, pre-confirmation
9 arrears be set out in a proof of claim and paid by the trustee, at least
10 as to attorney's fees and costs, it contravenes G.O. 97-1, which gives a
11 secured creditor the choice of including such fees and costs in a proof
12 of claim or simply disclosing them.¹⁶ To the extent the provision
13 requires arrearage components to be set out in a proof of claim subject
14 to objection, if the home lenders seek payment from the trustee, it
15 tracks ¶ 2(b)(1) which provides the trustee will only pay "allowed"
16 claims, and is thus surplusage.¹⁷ To the extent it seeks to define what
17 interest rate can be charged on the arrearage, it is surplusage, as it
18 restates § 1322(e). To the extent it requires that the post-confirmation
19 interest rate be stated in the proof of claim, ("g" above), it is

21 ¹⁵ Paying "arrears" is what "cures" a default. Cohen v. Lopez (In re Lopez), 372 B.R. 40, 49 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
22 (C.D. Cal.) 2007) ("cure . . . inextricably intertwined with the concept of arrears").

23 ¹⁶ G.O. 97-1's disclosure procedure as to attorney's fees and costs (with opportunity to object) protects the
24 "due process" Debtors argue they are entitled to.

25 ¹⁷ Plan ¶ 2(b)(1) requires that Debtors, if curing and reinstating, must state the estimated prepetition arrearage.
26 It then provides: "THE ARREARAGES SHOWN IN A TIMELY FILED AND ALLOWED SECURED CLAIM
SHALL CONTROL." This clause does not limit arrearages to pre-petition arrears; thus post-petition arrearages may
also be paid through ¶ 2(b)(1). See, McCullum, supra.

1 unnecessary, as the plan at ¶ 2(b)(1) contains a column for same. To the
2 extent it limits the parties who may file claims objections to the
3 Debtors and the trustee, it is inappropriate as any party in interest has
4 standing to object to claims. § 502(a). To the extent the requirement
5 that the arrears be "reasonable" tracks what is required under the
6 agreements, nonbankruptcy law and/or the Bankruptcy Code, it is
7 surplusage; to the extent an arrearage element need not be "reasonable"
8 to be allowed, the provision misstates the law, and is thus
9 "inappropriate."

10 **¶ 17. Additional Payments for Postpetition**
11 **Arrears.** *The arrears shall also include any*
12 *postpetition arrearage amounts consisting of*
13 *the following items, but only to the extent*
14 *these amounts are reasonable and have been*
15 *actually incurred, are authorized by the note*
and security agreement and applicable
nonbankruptcy law, and have been approved by
court order or agreement between the
Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank, the Debtors
and the Trustee:

- 16 a) *any delinquent postpetition*
installment payments due;
17 b) *any unpaid postpetition late fees;*
18 c) *any unpaid reasonable postpetition*
attorney fees, to the extent not being
19 *recovered under paragraph 16(d) above;*
20 d) *any unpaid postpetition escrow*
shortage or deficiency, as defined
under RESPA, to the extent not being
21 *recovered as part of the unpaid*
postpetition installment payments
22 *provided in (a) above; and*
23 (e) *any interest on the postpetition*
arrears, if expressly provided for in
the terms of the note and security
agreement.

24 As discussed above, Debtors cannot define the term "arrears."
25 Further, to the extent ¶ 17 reiterates the parties' agreement and
26 nonbankruptcy law, it is surplusage. Paragraph 17 also expands ¶ 16's

1 definition of "arrears" to include "post-petition" arrears, and thus
2 requires that post-petition arrears be set out in a proof of claim and
3 paid by the trustee. At least as to attorney's fees and costs, this
4 contravenes G.O. 97-1. Also, ¶ 17, like ¶ 16, requires a
5 "reasonableness" finding as to all arrearage elements, and may be
6 problematic for the reasons stated above. Further, ¶ 17 allows post-
7 petition arrears only after "court order or agreement between
8 Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank, the Debtors and the Trustee." This
9 contradicts ¶ 2(b)(1) which provides for payment of "allowed" claims. An
10 "allowed" arrearage claim does not necessarily require that a court order
11 be entered or an agreement reached. If a creditor's original or amended
12 proof of claim includes post-petition arrears and no party in interest
13 objects, the claim is deemed allowed without court order or agreement.
14 11 U.S.C. § 502(a); see, also, In re Maxwell, 343 B.R. 278, 279 (Bankr.
15 M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding a plan clause requiring a court order allowing
16 post-petition fees, costs and interest violated § 1322(b)(2)). Finally,
17 requiring payment of all post-petition arrears (along with pre-petition
18 arrears) through this plan will be problematic, as the plan is scheduled
19 to run 60 months, and Debtors are already dedicating all their disposable
20 income. The plan does not have the flexibility to fund post-petition
21 arrears without decreasing the approximate 11% dividend to general
22 unsecured creditors currently proposed. Paying post-petition arrears in
23 any significant amount would most likely necessitate a modified plan.

24 **¶ 6 [sic]¹⁸ Mortgage Current upon Plan**
25 **Completion.** *No other fees, costs or amounts*

26 ¹⁸ As noted above, ¶ "6" should have been numbered "18."

1 incurred by Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank
2 during this chapter 13 case and asserted to be
3 due on the Debtors' mortgage account(s) may be
4 collected or charged to the Debtors during the
5 case or after entry of discharge except as
6 permitted by this plan, and no payments
7 received by Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank
8 from the Debtors or the Trustee shall be
9 applied and credited except as directed and
10 required by this plan.

11 Again, this provision locks the home lenders into a proof of
12 claim, at least as to attorney's fees and costs, in contravention of G.O.
13 97-1. Further, it bootstraps them into collecting only those fees and
14 costs "permitted by this plan." As the court interprets the contested
15 paragraphs, only fees and costs in an allowed proof of claim, which are
16 paid by the trustee are "permitted." If however, Debtors default under
17 the plan, and the home lenders are granted relief from the automatic
18 stay, this clause could conceivably prevent the lenders from collecting
19 their fees and costs upon non-judicial foreclosure and sale. Only in the
20 rare instance would a plan "permit" foreclosure.

21 *Prior to completion of payments under this*
22 *plan, Citifinancial and/or Umpqua Bank may*
23 *seek a determination concerning the*
24 *sufficiency of payments received under the*
25 *plan. Unless the Court orders otherwise,*
26 *pursuant to an appropriate motion or pleading,*
 an order granting a discharge in this case
 shall be a determination that all prepetition
 and postpetition defaults with respect to the
 Debtors' mortgage(s) have been cured within
 the meaning of § 1325(b)(5)[sic],¹⁹ and that
 the Debtors' mortgage account(s) is deemed
 current and reinstated on the original payment
 schedule under the note(s) and security
 agreement(s) as if no default(s) had ever
 occurred.

¹⁹ Section "1325(b)(5)" does not exist. The reference was most likely intended to be "§ 1322(b)(5)."

1 Being deemed "current" at the end of the plan is the goal for
2 Chapter 13 debtors curing and reinstating home mortgages. The clause
3 giving the home lenders an opportunity to seek a court determination of
4 the sufficiency of payments received is unremarkable, and probably
5 unnecessary, as the court knows of no statute or rule prohibiting same.
6 The balance of the paragraph contravenes G.O. 97-1 as to attorney's fees
7 and costs, because it assumes all arrears will be paid through the plan.
8 Even if the requirement that all arrears be set out in a proof of claim
9 is stricken, the provision creates a default rule deeming cure upon
10 discharge unless the creditor has filed a motion and obtained a court
11 order otherwise. While courts have upheld procedural hoops to preserve
12 collection of arrearages as not being "modifications" of secured
13 creditors' rights, see e.g., Wilson, supra; Andrews, supra,²⁰ Jones v.
14 Wells Fargo (In re Jones), 2007 WL 2480494 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007),
15 putting the onus on the creditor to obtain a court order contravenes G.O.
16 97-1 as to attorney's fees and costs. See also, Maxwell, supra.

17 *Any willful failure of Citifinancial and/or*
18 *Umpqua Bank to credit payments in the manner*
19 *required by this plan or any act by*
20 *Citifinancial/and/or Umpqua Bank following the*
21 *entry of discharge to charge or collect any*
22 *amounts incurred or assessed during the*
23 *pendency of this chapter 13 case that were not*
24 *authorized by this plan or approved by the*
25 *Court after proper notice shall be a violation*
26 *of 11 U.S.C. § 524(i) and the injunction under*
§ 524(a) (2).

²⁰ In fact, as to attorney's fees and costs, G.O. 97-1 sets up one such procedural scheme, which has drawn no objection in the case at bar.

1 This provision is "inappropriate" under § 1322(b)(11). It
2 purports to preserve Debtors' § 524(i) remedy, but does not accurately
3 track its language, among other things, omitting the requirement that
4 there be material prejudice caused by the failure to credit. Further,
5 the provision suffers from the problem discussed above, where collection
6 is limited to amounts authorized by the plan or by court order. The plan
7 only authorizes arrearages through proofs of claims, which, as to
8 attorney's fees and costs, violates G.O. 97-1. Further, G.O. 97-1 does
9 not require a court order, only notice, to preserve an arrearage claim.

10 Conclusion:

11 One intent behind the contested paragraphs is to make sure there
12 are no surprises after completion of the plan regarding the balances due
13 on Debtors' home mortgages. This is a laudable end, but the means
14 employed unnecessarily confuse the process. Aside from the clauses
15 requiring "extra" notice to Debtors' counsel and the trustee, for the
16 reasons stated above, the contested paragraphs cannot stand.
17 Confirmation of Debtors' plan dated March 16, 2007 will thus be denied.
18 Debtors will be given 30 days from entry of the order denying

1 confirmation to file an amended plan.²¹ An order consistent with the
2 above will be entered.

3 This opinion constitutes the court's findings of fact and
4 conclusions of law under FED.R.BANKR.PROC. 7052. They shall not be
5 separately stated.

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15 ²¹ The court would be remiss if it did not give some guidance as to what might be "appropriate" plan
16 provisions to ensure no surprises at plan's end. G.O. 97-1 already provides a set of procedures. However, its scope is
17 limited. A plan provision expanding that scope, such as: "The procedures set out in G.O. 97-1 (as amended by G.O.
18 98-1), shall apply to all arrearage amounts (pre and post-petition), including all fees and costs, claimed by Umpqua
19 and Citifinancial," would likely be "appropriate." However, the court thinks it fair to alert the parties that this
District's Local Bankruptcy Rules are currently being revised, and it is probable that G.O. 97-1.4(b)(5)'s "deemed
cure" provisions will not survive the revisions. If "deemed cure" language is in fact stricken from the revised local
rules, insertion of similar language into a Chapter 13 plan, with the broadened scope outlined above, would also seem
appropriate.

20 The court further notes that the following language has been approved in other Chapter 13 plans in this
21 district.

22 Post-petition mortgage payments to secured creditor shall be applied to the first post-
23 petition payment due under the terms of the contract. Payments from the trustee to
24 secured creditor shall be applied to its pre-petition loan arrears claim. As long as
debtor timely pays all post-petition payments, secured creditor shall not assess any
fees or other charges on the basis that a post-petition payment is late.

25 Lender shall send such billing statements, coupons and statements regarding post-
26 petition advances and/or charges on the loan directly to the debtor as it customarily
sends when no bankruptcy has been filed.