

collateral description
constructive severance
crops
doctrine of the last antecedent
judicial lien
levy
personal property
reasonable identification
ORS 18.345
ORS 18.878
ORS 72.1070
ORS 79.0108
ORS 79.0203
ORS 79.0334(9)
ORS 79.0502
11 USC 101(36)
11 USC 544(a)(1)

Grogan v. Harvest Co. et. al (In re Grogan) Adv. # 11-6276-tmr
7/26/12 TMR

2012 WL ??

Plaintiffs, the Chapter 11 debtors, operated a Christmas tree farm. In the context of cross-motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued their strong-arm rights trumped any rights Defendants had by virtue of their perfected mortgages, which arguably covered the trees as real property. The Court agreed. Section 544(a)(1) gave Debtors the status of a judicial lien creditor which is defined amongst other things, as a creditor holding a lien obtained by levy. Under Oregon law, the Christmas trees would be considered personal property which could be levied upon by the sheriff separately from the land. As to personal property, under Oregon law, a creditor holding a lien by levy is given the rights of a creditor with a perfected UCC Article 9 security interest. Under Oregon's Article 9, a creditor with a perfected security interest has priority over a creditor claiming a real property lien in the same collateral. Plaintiffs' lien rights in the trees thus had priority over Defendants' asserted real estate interests.

Plaintiffs also claimed Defendants' security interests in the trees (as personal property) were not effective and/or were avoidable because the descriptions of the trees in the respective security agreements and financing statements were deficient. The Court disagreed. It examined Oregon law relating to the standards for describing collateral in those documents, concluding that a description is sufficient if it reasonably identifies what is described. This standard is met if the description has enough information to enable a third party upon reasonable inquiry to determine the collateral's identity. The Court also examined the "doctrine of the last antecedent" and other textual and contextual aids in construing the language in the security agreements and financing statements. Viewing that language in context and in relation to the documents as a whole, the Court found it sufficient to meet the "reasonable identification" standard. In granting Defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment, it held the security interests in the trees and their proceeds were properly perfected and thus unavoidable.

1 alternatively, assuming such [liens] exist, the second claim seeks to avoid the liens under 11 U.S.C. § 544.¹
2 The Complaint also seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants have counterclaimed for their
3 own attorney’s fees and costs. Harvest also filed a third party action against Plaintiffs’ counsel. By
4 stipulated order entered on February 15, 2012, that third party claim has been bifurcated from the original
5 claims and counterclaims, and abated pending judgment on those claims.

6 Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. The motions have been briefed and
7 argued, and are ripe for decision. The Court has reviewed and considered the motions, along with all
8 documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motions, the pleadings, applicable legal authorities, and
9 other submissions in the file. The parties have stipulated that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the
10 adversary proceeding under 28 USC §§ 157 and 1334, United States District Court Local Rule 2100.1 and
11 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”) 7001. The parties have also affirmatively agreed that this
12 is a core proceeding under 28 USC § 157(b)(2)(K) and that the Court has appropriate Constitutional
13 authority to rule on this matter.

14 **Facts:**

15 Plaintiffs own and operate, as a sole proprietorship, Silver Bells Tree Farm, located in Marion
16 County, Oregon, where they plant and grow Christmas trees. Silver Bells Tree Farms consists of numerous
17 parcels of real property, some owned and some leased by Plaintiffs. Within twelve years of being planted,
18 generally, the Christmas trees are harvested for sale. As set forth below, at various times Plaintiffs took out
19 secured loans with Harvest and Demeter. Demeter also took an assignment of a secured loan. The
20 particulars of the security interests given for those loans are referenced in the “Discussion” section.

21 Harvest Loans:

22 In September 2006, Plaintiffs borrowed \$7,000,000 from Harvest as evidenced by two (2) promissory
23 notes -- one for \$5,500,000 (**Note A**), the other for \$1,500,000 (**Note B**). Note A and Note B are secured by
24 a combined mortgage/security agreement (**the Harvest Security Agreement**), which was duly recorded in
25

26 ¹Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory references are to Title 11 of the United States Code.

1 the real property records of Marion County. In addition, on September 20, 2006, and September 2, 2009,
2 respectively, Harvest filed an original and amended Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) financing statement
3 with the Oregon Secretary of State (**the Harvest Financing Statements**). The Harvest Financing Statements
4 were timely continued by a continuation statement filed on August 4, 2011.

5 Demeter Loans:

6 Direct Loan:

7 In March 2008, Plaintiffs borrowed \$225,000 from Demeter evidenced by a promissory note, secured
8 by a combined mortgage, assignment of rents and security agreement and fixture filing. In February 2010,
9 the original note was replaced by a \$400,000 note (**the Demeter Note**). The original mortgage/security
10 agreement was also replaced by an amended and restated agreement (**the Demeter Security Agreement**).
11 The Demeter Security Agreement was duly recorded in the Marion County real property records on February
12 19, 2010. In addition, Demeter filed a UCC financing statement with the Oregon Secretary of State on
13 March 18, 2008 (**the Demeter Financing Statement**).

14 Assigned Loan:

15 In September 2008, Plaintiffs borrowed \$500,000 from Heinze Investments, LLC (**Heinze**) by
16 executing a promissory note (**the Heinze Note**). The Heinze Note was secured by two combined
17 mortgage/security agreements which were recorded in the Marion County real property records on
18 September 25, 2008. One of the mortgages created a lien on two parcels of real property identified as
19 "Canyon Barn" and "North Livingston" (**the Livingston Mortgage**). The Canyon Barn parcel was later
20 released from the mortgage, leaving the Livingston parcel as the only security thereunder. At no relevant
21 time did the Livingston parcel contain Christmas trees. The other mortgage granted a lien on nine (9)
22 separate tracts of real property, which comprised the whole of Plaintiffs' farm (**the Blanket Mortgage**).

23 In September 2008, and September 2009, respectively, Heinze filed with the Oregon Secretary of
24 State an original and amended UCC financing statement for the personal property described in both
25 mortgages (**the Heinze Financing Statements**). In February 2011, Heinze assigned its interest in the Heinze
26 Note, both mortgages and the Heinze Financing Statements to Demeter.

1 **Summary Judgment Standards:**

2 On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to show there is no genuine
3 dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil
4 Procedure (FRCP) 56(a) (made applicable by FRBP 7056). Material facts are such facts as may affect the
5 outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). “A
6 dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
7 for the non-moving party.’” FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010)
8 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

9 All reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine disputes as to material facts should be resolved
10 against the moving party, Crosswhite v. Jumpking, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1230 (D. Or. 2006), and all
11 rational or reasonable inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
12 to the non-moving party. T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 809 F.2d 626, 630
13 (9th Cir.1987).

14 The parties all confirm that the Court can resolve the issues by looking to the referenced documents
15 and that no factual dispute exists.

16 **Discussion:**

17 Defendants argue their security agreements and financing statements are sufficient to render their
18 rights in the Christmas trees superior to Plaintiffs’ under Oregon’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code
19 (UCC). Alternatively Defendants argue their interests are superior based on certain recorded mortgages.²
20 The Court will address the alternative argument first.

21 Defendants’ Rights in Christmas trees as real property:

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26 ²In this regard, Demeter adopted Harvest’s arguments.

1 For purposes of its analysis, the Court will assume for argument’s sake that the “mortgage” portions
2 of the Harvest and Demeter Security Agreements³ also cover growing crops thereon, including the Christmas
3 trees. Put another way, the Court assumes Oregon law would consider the Christmas trees part of the real
4 property given as security. See, e.g., Jones v. Adams, 37 Or. 473, 476, 59 P. 811, 811 (1900) (recognizing
5 that unless the crops belong to a tenant, “[a] real-estate mortgage [given by the landowner] is not only a lien
6 upon the land, but also upon the annual crops growing thereon”); Falk v. Amsberry, 53 Or. App. 735, 739,
7 633 P.2d 799, 802 (1981) (recognizing that depending on the relationship of the parties to each other, in
8 some situations growing crops may be considered real property while in others they are considered
9 personalty). The issue is whether perfected real estate liens in the Christmas trees trump a bankruptcy
10 trustee’s strong-arm powers.

11 A Chapter 11 debtor in possession has the rights and powers of a trustee. § 1107(a). Section
12 544(a)(1) gives a trustee, as of the commencement of the case, the rights and powers, including the power to
13 avoid transfers, of a creditor that extends credit and obtains as of the commencement of the case, “a judicial
14 lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien.”
15 (emphasis added). No such creditor need actually exist. Id. Further, actual notice of a competing interest
16 will not defeat the trustee’s rights. Id. A “judicial lien” is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration,
17 or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” § 101(36) (emphasis added).⁴ While bankruptcy law gives
18 the trustee the rights and powers of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, those rights and powers are usually
19 determined under state law. Bullock v. Roost (In re Gold Key Properties, Inc.), 119 B.R. 787, 789 (Bankr.
20 D. Or. 1990).

21 Under Oregon law, entry of a judgment creates a lien on all of the judgment debtor’s real property
22 located in the county in which the judgment is entered. ORS 18.150(2). However, the judgment’s entry does
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24 ³At oral argument, Demeter conceded it was not claiming the Christmas trees as collateral based on
25 either the Livingston or Blanket Mortgages.

26 ⁴In turn a “lien” is a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation.” § 101(37).

1 not create a lien on personal property in the judgment debtor’s possession. Such a lien is only created when
2 the sheriff, pursuant to a writ of execution obtained by the judgment creditor, actually levies on the personal
3 property, as a predicate to the property’s sale to satisfy the judgment. See U.S. v. \$319,603.42 in U.S.
4 Currency, 829 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (1992) (construing ORS 23.410, Oregon’s predecessor “lien by levy”
5 statute). ORS 18.878(1) provides the methods by which a sheriff may levy on both real and personal
6 property. As to tangible personal property, the sheriff may seize it, ORS 18.878(1)(b), secure and deliver it,
7 if instructed to do so, ORS 18.878(1)(e), or attach a notice to it, essentially telling persons not to move or
8 damage it pending sale. ORS 18.878(1)(c); ORS 18.880. Under ORS 18.878(2), “[w]hen a sheriff levies on
9 personal property in any manner described in subsection (1) . . ., the interest of the judgment creditor in the
10 personal property is the same as that of a secured creditor with an interest in the property perfected under
11 ORS chapter 79.” (emphasis added).

12 Defendants argue that growing crops are not “personal property” within the ambit of ORS 18.878(2).
13 The Court disagrees. While ORS Chapter 18 does not define the term “personal property,” ORS 18.878(2)
14 specifically cross references perfected interests under ORS chapter 79 (UCC Article 9). There, Christmas
15 trees are personal property. In particular, as the parties concede, they are “crops,” Rainier Nat’l Bank v.
16 Security State Bank, 59 Wash App. 161, 164, 796 P.2d 443, 445 (1990), which are “goods,” ORS
17 79.0102(1)(qq)(A), (B)(iv), and more particularly on the facts at bar, “farm products.” ORS
18 79.0102(1)(hh)(A), (ii).

19 Defendants further argue the trees are not solely personal property as between Plaintiffs and
20 Defendants in that they have a dual nature; that is, they are viewed under Oregon law as also being real
21 property. Again assuming arguendo that statement is true, it nevertheless examines the wrong relationship.
22 The relationship to be examined is whether as between Plaintiffs wearing their hat as hypothetical “lien by
23 levy” holders and Plaintiffs wearing their hat as judgment debtors, the trees are personal property. As
24 discussed above, they are. Further even assuming the Court were to look at Plaintiffs’ relationship with
25 Defendants, ORS 18.878(2) does not require that the property levied upon be “solely” personal property,
26 only that it be personal property.

1 Defendants also argue that a sheriff would or could never levy on growing crops as personal property
2 (i.e. apart from the land) under ORS 18.878(1), and thus the first condition of ORS 18.878(2) which assumes
3 a levy is possible, can never be satisfied. Again, the Court disagrees. Under ORS 18.345(1), unless exempt,
4 “[a]ll [personal] property . . . of the judgment debtor, shall be liable to an execution.” If the law
5 contemplates that “all” personal property shall be liable to an execution, then it must provide a means of
6 doing so. When confronted with a writ of execution to levy on a crop, the sheriff would have the option of
7 tagging the crop or seizing (harvesting) it. In fact, in Keel v. Levy, 19 Or. 450, 24 P. 253 (1890), the sheriff
8 did exactly that; he harvested the crop. Other Oregon cases also make clear that a growing crop, in and of
9 itself, may be levied upon. See, e.g., Brown v. Jones et. al., 130 Or. 424, 432, 278 P. 981, 983 (1929).

10 Because, under §§ 544(a)(1) and 101(36), a trustee is armed with a lien obtained by amongst other
11 things “levy,” by virtue of ORS 18.878(2), a trustee is deemed to have a perfected Article 9 security interest
12 in the crops. As to priorities, when a perfected real estate lien in crops clashes with a UCC lien, “[a]
13 perfected security interest in crops growing on real property has priority over a conflicting interest of an
14 encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the
15 real property.” ORS 79.0334(9) [UCC 9-334(i)] (emphasis added).⁵ Official Comment 12 to UCC 9-334
16 explains:

17 Growing crops are “goods” in which a security interest may be created and
18 perfected under this Article. In some jurisdictions, a mortgage of real property
19 may cover crops, as well. In the event that crops are encumbered by both a
20 mortgage and an Article 9 security interest, subsection (i) provides that the
21 security interest has priority.⁶

22 Thus under ORS 79.0334(9), Plaintiffs’ rights as a party holding a perfected Article 9 security
23 interest (by virtue of ORS 18.878(2)) trump any rights Defendants may assert in the Christmas trees (crops)

24 ⁵There is no dispute Plaintiffs are in possession of and/or have a recorded interest in the land upon
25 which the Christmas trees are growing.

26 ⁶While lacking the force of law, the Official Comments nonetheless are instructive in interpreting
Oregon’s Commercial Code. Belmont International, Inc. v. American International Shoe Co., 313 Or. 112,
119, n.8, 831 P.2d 15, 19 (1992)(internal quotation and citation omitted).

1 by virtue of their mortgages on the land. Nevertheless Defendants cite ORS 72.1070 (UCC 2-107) to argue
2 the contrary. That section concerns “sales of” (not security interests in) “goods” that will eventually be
3 severed from realty.⁷ Under ORS 72.1070(2) identifiable growing crops may be separately contracted to be
4 sold apart from the land, no matter who is responsible for severing them, even if the crops are considered
5 realty at the time of contracting. Subsection 3 to ORS 72.1070 goes on to provide:

6 The provisions of this section are subject to any third party rights provided
7 by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be executed
8 and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall then
 constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract for sale.

9 ORS 72.1070(3) (emphasis added). Defendants seem to argue this language by implication negates ORS
10 79.0334(9) and throws priority issues back to real estate law. That is not the case. Subsection 3 is limited to
11 the “provisions of this section,” which again relate to sales not security interests. Further, Official Comment
12 3 to UCC 2-107 makes clear that “[t]he security phases of things attached to or to become attached to realty
13 are dealt with in the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9)” Subsection 3's purpose is explained in
14 Anderson’s treatise:

15 Prior to severance, the local recording statutes may make it possible for
16 third persons to acquire rights superior to the buyer.

17 Without regard to whether things to be removed from realty constitute
18 goods within Article 2, third parties may have superior rights in the goods
 because of their rights in the land and in things attached to the land arising by
 virtue of these recording statutes.

19 To guard against and prevent third parties from acquiring rights in the
20 things to be severed, the parties to a sale of the property that is attached or to
21 be severed may treat the transaction as one involving land for the purpose of
22 recording. That is, they may execute the contract in the same manner as would
 be required of a contract for the sale of land, whereupon they may record the
 contract and, thereby, give notice to all of the buyer's rights thereunder.

23 2 Anderson U.C.C. § 2-107:11, 12 (3d. ed.). See also Robison v. Gerber Products Co., 765 F.2d 431, 433
24 (4th Cir. 1985). Protecting against third parties does not somehow transform purchased goods into realty.

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26 ⁷Under ORS 72.1050(1) “growing crops” for sales purposes, are, as they are for security purposes,
“goods.”

1 Finally, much is made as to whether the Christmas trees have been “constructively severed.”

2 ‘Constructive’ severance implies a situation in which an item of property is
3 deemed by the law to have been severed from the land, even though it has not
4 been severed as a matter of physical fact. But all that this so-called ‘severance’
signifies is the thing in question is thereafter to be regarded in law as personal
property.

5 Pepin v. City of N. Bend, 198 F. Supp. 644, 649 (D. Or. 1961). Defendants argue such severance is
6 necessary to convert the trees into personalty. Plaintiffs argue that even if constructive severance was
7 required, it occurred upon the bankruptcy filing based upon the hypothetical levy. Oregon courts however
8 have recognized that when a statutory scheme covers the subject matter, that scheme rather than the
9 constructive severance doctrine should be applied. Paullus v. Yarbrough, 219 Or. 611, 622-23, 347 P.2d
10 620, 626 (1959) (applying the then-in-effect Uniform Sales Act to determine whether timber was included in
11 the definition of “goods” therein). As discussed above, ORS 18.878(2) specifically references Article 9,
12 under which growing crops are personalty whether constructively severed or not. Accord Hawkins v. City of
13 La Grande, 315 Or. 57, 70, 843 P.2d 400, 408 (1992) (applying statutory definition of growing crops as
14 “goods” under UCC sales provisions, in context of constitutional “takings” clause). Thus the constructive
15 severance doctrine is inapplicable.

16 In sum, the Bankruptcy Code gives Plaintiffs the rights and powers of a creditor with a “lien by levy”
17 on personal property. Under Oregon law, growing crops are personal property and the sheriff under a writ of
18 execution is able to levy thereon. Further, under Oregon law, a creditor with a “lien by levy” is deemed to
19 have all the rights of a creditor with a perfected Article 9 security interest. Under Oregon’s Article 9, a
20 creditor with a perfected security interest in crops has priority over a perfected real estate lien covering
21 crops. As such, Defendants’ alternative theory of priority fails.

22 Defendants’ Rights in Christmas trees as personal property:

23 The motions raise two issues with regard to Defendants’ rights in the Christmas trees as personal
24 property. The first is whether they have an enforceable security interest in the trees. In particular, Plaintiffs
25 challenge the sufficiency of the collateral description in the various pertinent documents. If in fact
26 Defendants have such an interest, the second issue is whether it has been perfected.

1 Relevant Law:

2 Sufficiency of collateral descriptions in security agreements:

3 The parties concede Oregon law applies. ORS 79.0203(2)(c)(A) [UCC 9-203(b)(3)(A)] provides in
4 pertinent part, “a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the
5 collateral only if . . . [t]he debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the
6 collateral . . .” (emphasis added). The requirement of a writing in ORS 79.0203(2)(c)(A) is in the nature of
7 a statute of frauds. Official Comment 3 to UCC 9-203. ORS 79.0108(1) [UCC 9-108(a)] provides (with
8 exceptions not relevant here), that “a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is
9 specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.” (emphasis added). In turn, ORS 79.0108(2) [UCC 9-
10 108(b)] sets out what constitutes “reasonable identification.” Among other methods of identification, the
11 collateral description meets the standard by a “[s]pecific listing,” ORS 79.0108(2)(a), as well as (with
12 exceptions not relevant here), by “any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively
13 determinable.” ORS 79.0108(2)(f) [UCC 9-108(b)(6)].

14 Oregon courts have rejected a “reasonable identification” test that requires exactitude and excessive
15 detail. Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 664, 566 P.2d 470, 481 (1977). See also Official Comment
16 2 to UCC 9-108 (“This section rejects any requirement that a description is insufficient unless it is exact and
17 detailed (the so-called ‘serial number’ test).” In construing ORS 79.0108’s predecessor, former ORS
18 79.1100, which likewise had a “reasonable identification” requirement, this Court has held that a description
19 of crop land “need only recite enough information to enable third parties to locate, upon reasonable inquiry,
20 the land where the collateral is growing.” Willamette Production Credit Assoc. v. Lovelady (In re Lovelady),
21 21 B.R. 182, 184 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982).⁸ It further held the “reasonable inquiry” test as to crop land was
22 consistent with the same test developed for other types of collateral. Id. at 184. Accord Appleway Leasing,
23 Inc. v. Wilken, 39 Or. App. 43, 47, 591 P.2d 382, 384 (1979) (construing former ORS 79.1100, and holding
24 description of borrower’s lone tractor in financing statement that recited correct model but incorrect serial

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26 ⁸The necessity to describe crop land to create or perfect a security interest in crops has since been
eliminated.

1 number nonetheless was sufficient to put third party on inquiry). Courts in other jurisdictions construing
2 both the current and former statutes concur. See, e.g., Rice v. Miller, 21 Misc. 3d 573, 577, 864 N.Y.S.2d
3 255, 258 (2008) (applying New York law, UCC 9-108(b)(6)'s standard is met "if a third party could
4 determine what items of the debtor's collateral are subject to the creditor's security interest" (internal
5 quotation omitted)); Nolden v. Plant Reclamation (In re Amex-Protein Development Corp.), 504 F.2d 1056,
6 1060 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying California law, "[t]he description in the security agreement is sufficient [for
7 purposes of UCC 9-110]. . . if it provides such information as would lead a reasonable inquirer to the identity
8 of the collateral"). The Nolden court further clarified that: 1) "[i]t is enough if the description allows a third
9 party, aided by information which the security agreement suggests, to identify the property" Id. at 1061; and
10 2) "[t]here is no requirement that the description of the collateral be complete within the four corners of the
11 security agreement or other single document." Id. at 1060.

12 Sufficiency of collateral descriptions in financing statements:

13 Under ORS 79.0502(1)(c), a financing statement must "indicate" the collateral it covers. Under ORS
14 79.0504(1), a financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it meets the above ORS 79.0108
15 standards.

16 Harvest:

17 Harvest Security Agreement

18 At the outset, it is important to note Plaintiffs do not argue they did not intend to grant Harvest a
19 security interest in Christmas trees. Rather they rely solely on their theory that the Harvest Security
20 Agreement is a defective writing. The Harvest Security Agreement provides in relevant part:

21 To secure payment of the Indebtedness and performance of all obligations
22 of Mortgagor under this Mortgage, Mortgagor mortgages and conveys to
Lender the following:

23 (1) The real property in Marion County, Oregon described on
24 attached Exhibit A (the 'Real Property');⁹

25 . . .

26 ⁹The "Real Property" consists of the entire farm.

1 (4) All trees, bushes, vines and other permanent plantings now
2 or hereafter located on the real property (the “Plantings”);

3 (5) All intellectual property rights now or hereafter held by
4 Mortgagor with respect to Plantings now or hereafter growing
5 on the Real Property, including, without limitation, the SILVER
6 BELLS BLUE™ NOBLE FIR trademark and other labels,
7 logos, patents or patent licenses and trademark rights (the
8 “Intellectual Property Rights”); and

9 (6) All of Mortgagor’s right, title and interest in all leases of or
10 pertaining to the Real Property whether as landlord or tenant
11 (the “Leases”).

12 . . .

13 Mortgagor grants Lender a security interest in the . . . Plantings,
14 . . . the Intellectual Property Rights and the Leases.

15 Harvest invokes the “doctrine of the last antecedent” (the DOTLA) to argue “permanent” in § 4
16 modifies only “vines,” and not “bushes” or “trees,” and thus because a Christmas tree is a “tree,” a
17 description naming “all trees” is sufficient for ORS 79.0108 purposes.

18 Under the DOTLA:

19 Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention
20 appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is the last
21 word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the
22 meaning of the sentence.

23 Evidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents
24 instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that
25 it is separated from the antecedents by a comma.

26 State v. Webb, 324 Or. 380, 386, 927 P.2d 79, 82 (1996) (internal quotation omitted). Although usually
applied to statutes, the DOTLA has been applied to contracts as well. Milne v. Milne Constr. Co., 207 Or.
App. 382, 387, n.3, 142 P.3d 475, 477 (2006). However, the DOTLA is “only a textual aid, and its
application yields to more persuasive contextual evidence of the . . . [parties’] intent . . .” Bridgeview
Vineyards, Inc. v. State Land Bd., 211 Or. App. 251, 270, 154 P.3d 734, 744 (2007).

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1 Applying the DOTLA combines “vines and other permanent plantings” into one item in a series.
2 Viewing the context, other sections in the grant paragraph could be construed as doing the same thing.¹⁰
3 Further, although the debate rages, omitting the serial (aka “Harvard” or “Oxford”) comma before the
4 conjunction joining the last item in a series has been accepted by highly credible style sources.¹¹ On the
5 other hand, applying the DOTLA leaves § 4 without a coordinating conjunction. This equates to the grant of
6 a security interest in “all apples, peaches, oranges,” instead of “all apples [trees], peaches [bushes], and
7 oranges [vines and other permanent plantings]. All of the other clauses in the “grant” provisions, however,
8 have such a conjunction (albeit some with a preceding comma). See Exhibit 1 to Walker Declaration in
9 Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. These competing contextual clues leave unresolved
10 whether the DOTLA should apply and thus whether “permanent” modifies “trees” and “bushes” as well as
11 “vines.” Such ambiguity alone would cause a reasonable third party to inquire further. However, even
12 assuming arguendo that a reasonable third party would conclude that the DOTLA does not apply and thus
13 “permanent” modifies “trees” in § 4, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument below, that does not end the Court’s
14 inquiry.

15 Plaintiffs’ main argument is that “permanent trees” necessarily exclude Christmas trees because, as
16 discussed above, Christmas trees are “crops” under the UCC, Rainier Nat’l Bank, 59 Wash App. at 164, 796
17 P.2d at 445, and “crops” by definition are not “permanent.” Plaintiffs misread Rainier’s scope. There, after
18 determining Christmas trees were “crops,” the court examined whether the term “inventory” in a competing
19 bank’s financing statement properly perfected a security interest in Christmas trees. The court held that,

21 ¹⁰Section 2 grants a security interest in “[a]ll furnishings, fixtures (including trade fixtures), supplies,
22 equipment_ and inventory used for the production of water on the Real property or for the irrigation or
23 drainage thereof” Section 3 grants a security interest in “[a]ll water, water rights, ditches and ditch
24 rights, any permits, licenses, certificates_ or shares of stock evidencing any such water right or ditch rights . .
25 . . .” (missing commas indicated by “_”).

26 ¹¹Compare *AP Stylebook*, p. 373 (Darrell Christian, Sally Jacobsen and David Minthorn eds., 46th
ed. Basic Books 2011) (comma should be omitted), with *The Chicago Manual of Style*, ¶ 6.18 (16th ed.
University of Chicago Press 2010) (comma should be inserted), and Bryan Garner, *The Elements of Legal
Style*, § 2.1, 15-16, (2d ed. Oxford University Press 2002) (always use a serial comma).

1 because by UCC definition the term “inventory” necessarily excluded “crops,” the bank’s security interest
2 was unperfected and thus subordinate. Here, Harvest does not pin its hopes on the word “inventory,” but
3 instead relies on the above-quoted language, which in no way connects “crops” or “trees” with “inventory”
4 or for that matter any other UCC-defined term. Therefore, even if the Court were to follow Rainier, it is not
5 dispositive. The meaning of the “permanent trees” description must still be considered.

6 Security agreements are construed like any other contract. Community Bank, 278 Or. at 659, 566
7 P.2d at 478. The Court must consider disputed language in the context of the contract as a whole. Williams
8 v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 351 Or. 368, 379, 271 P.3d 103, 109 (2011). Section 4 includes “permanent”
9 trees as part of a defined term: “the Plantings.” Use of the word “Plantings” to define the group of plants
10 which are collateral itself connotes something planted as opposed to growing naturally. A “planting” is
11 defined as: “an area where plants are grown for commercial or decorative purposes; *also*: the plants grown in
12 such an area.” Merriam-Webster Online; www.merriam-webster.com (as searched July 12, 2012). Here, a
13 reasonable third party would know the only (or at least the vast majority of) crops Plaintiffs plant are
14 Christmas trees.¹² Further, as Harvest argues, the phrase “permanent crops” is commonly used in many
15 statutory schemes, typically to distinguish them from “annual” crops. See, e.g., West’s Ann. Cal. Water
16 Code § 35454 (distinguishing “permanent crops” from “annual crops” for purposes of water use); 40 CFR
17 § 158.1410(e)(7) (noting “various tree crops and vines” as examples of “permanent food crops” and
18 asparagus and pineapples as examples of “semi-permanent food crops” for purposes of pesticide residue
19 testing requirements); Wash. Rev. Code § 52.26.180(4)(b) (excluding “permanent growing crops” from the
20 definition of “improvements to real property” for purposes of a regional fire protection service authority’s
21 assessment of benefit charges on such improvements); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-12151(2) (defining
22 “agricultural real property” for property tax purposes as among other things “[a]n aggregate ten or more
23 gross acres of permanent crops”); 43 USC § 1600e(e)(9) (making Federal expenditures or financial
24 assistance available in the Colorado River Floodway for “compatible agricultural uses that do not involve

25
26 ¹²Evidence adduced at hearings in Plaintiffs’ main Chapter 11 case indicates upwards of 1,000,000
trees grow on Plaintiffs’ farm.

1 permanent crops”). This use belies Plaintiffs’ contention that “permanent” and “crops” are mutually
2 exclusive.

3 Finally, and most importantly, any reasonable person’s doubt as to what “all permanent trees” means
4 in § 4 would be resolved by § 5. That section grants a security interest in all intellectual property . . . “with
5 respect to Plantings” and includes the SILVER BELLS BLUE™ NOBLE FIR trademark. (emphasis added).
6 Plaintiffs concede this is the mark for their Christmas trees. It is part of the intellectual property “with
7 respect to Plantings.” “With respect to” means “with reference to: in relation to.” Merriam-Webster Online;
8 www.merriam-webster.com (as searched July 12, 2012). Therefore, if a trademark on Christmas trees
9 “relates to” or “refers to” “Plantings,” then “Plantings” by necessity includes Christmas trees.

10 Even assuming §§ 4 and 5 were construed as leaving some doubt, they contain at least such
11 information as would lead a reasonable inquirer to identify Christmas trees as collateral. Again, context is
12 key. Plaintiffs in essence argue § 4 would cause a third party to stop dead in its tracks upon reading the
13 collateral is “permanent” trees. However, that third party would know Harvest loaned money to borrowers
14 with approximately 1,000,000 Christmas trees on their property, and whose primary, if not sole, source of
15 income to repay the loan was generated by those trees. In that context, language which in essence takes
16 those trees and their proceeds off the table as a source to satisfy a \$7,000,000 loan would need to be crystal
17 clear to stop further inquiry. No such crystal clear exclusionary language exists. Finally, any lingering
18 doubt would be dispelled upon a reasonable inquirer’s examination of Note B, which the Harvest Security
19 Agreement references, and which specifically references Christmas trees as “collateral.”¹³

20
21 ¹³ Exhibit A to Note B provides in relevant part:

22 (j) Borrower shall provide Lender by March 1 of each year with a certified
23 tree inventory (the “Certificate of Inventory”) which will include a current
24 Christmas tree count for all land described in the Mortgage, categorized by
25 land tract, year planted and tree size. The Certification of Inventory shall also
26 include a two-year projected harvest and planting schedule identifying number
of trees, variety and location. Borrower shall certify that the Certificate of
Inventory as being true, correct and complete to Borrower’s best knowledge.

(continued...)

1 Harvest Financing Statements:

2 The description in the Harvest Financing Statements identifies the collateral in relevant part as:

3 3. All trees, bushes, vines and other permanent plantings now or hereafter
4 located on the Land.

5 4. All intellectual property rights of Debtor with respect to Christmas trees,
6 vines or other permanent plantings now or hereafter growing on the Land,
7 including, without limitation, the SILVER BELLS BLUE™ NOBLE FIR
8 trademark and all patents, trademarks and patent licenses and trademark rights.

9 Although this description does not precisely match the one in the Harvest Security Agreement, the
10 differences in fact further clarify that Christmas trees are part of Harvest’s security. Again, the word
11 “plantings” (although not a capitalized defined term) is used. Further, and more compelling, even using
12 Plaintiffs’ anti-DOTLA construction, § 4 would specifically include “Christmas trees” as a subset of
13 “permanent plantings.” For these reasons and those stated with regard to the Harvest Security Agreement,
14 the Harvest Financing Statements meet ORS 79.0108(2)’s requirement, and thus by definition ORS
15 79.0504’s standard of reasonable identification.

16 Demeter:

17 Demeter Security Agreement:

18 Section 4 of the collateral description in the Demeter Security Agreement specifically references
19 “[a]ll Christmas trees” as part of the collateral. It thus clearly meets ORS 79.0108(2)’s standard.

20 Demeter Financing Statement:

21 The Demeter Financing Statement has the exact same language as the Harvest Financing Statements,
22 and for the same reasons it sufficiently “indicates the collateral.” As such, Demeter has a perfected security
23 interest in the Christmas trees to secure payment of the Demeter Note.

24 ¹³(...continued)

25 (k) Borrower shall provide Lender complete access to the property encumbered
26 by the Mortgage within reasonable time after request for such access in order
27 to permit Lender to verify the information contained in the Certification of
28 Inventory or otherwise to confirm the collateral value of the Christmas trees
29 (the “Tree Collateral Value”) and the total collateral value of all property
30 encumbered by the Mortgage (the “Total Collateral Value”). (emphasis added).

1 Livingston and Blanket Mortgages:

2 While § 4 of the “grant” paragraph in the Livingston Mortgage specifically references “[a]ll
3 Christmas trees” as collateral, it is uncontradicted that at no relevant time have Christmas trees grown on the
4 North Livingston parcel. It is further uncontradicted that the Blanket Mortgage does not reference “trees,”
5 “Christmas trees,” “crops,” or any similar personal property verbiage. Because of these infirmities, Demeter
6 conceded at oral argument it was not claiming either of these mortgages cover the Christmas trees.

7 **Proceeds:**

8 Harvest and Demeter’s perfected security interests also extend to identifiable proceeds of the
9 Christmas trees. ORS 79.0315(1)(b)(security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds); ORS 79.0315
10 (3)(security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral
11 was perfected); ORS 79.0315(4)(b)(no lapse in perfection as to identifiable cash proceeds).¹⁴ See also
12 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) extending pre-petition security interests in proceeds post-petition, unless the court
13 orders otherwise.


14 **Conclusion:**

15 The Court concludes as a matter of law that the description in the Harvest and Demeter Security
16 Agreements reasonably identifies Christmas trees as collateral.¹⁵ Thus, Notes A and B, as well as the

17
18 ¹⁴ “Cash proceeds” encompass the money derived from sale of the trees. ORS 79.0102(1)(kkk)(A)
19 (“proceeds” are “[w]hatever is acquired upon the sale . . . or other disposition of collateral”), (i)(“[c]ash
20 proceeds are proceeds that are money, checks, deposit accounts or the like”). [Although not relevant here, it
21 is probable the term “the like” in ORS 79.0102(1)(i) refers to “money” and “checks” as well as “deposit
22 accounts,” yet no serial comma is used. See Official Comment 13(e) to UCC 9-102 (“the phrase ‘and the
23 like’ covers property that is functionally equivalent to ‘money, checks, or deposit accounts’ . . .”].

24 ¹⁵ It appears the majority rule is that the sufficiency of the collateral’s description is a question of law.
25 Compare Avlin Inc. v. Manis, 124 N.M. 544, 545, 953 P.2d 309, 310 (Ct. App. 1997) (question of law,
26 applying New Mexico law), and Bank of Cumming v. Chapman, 245 Ga. 261, 264 S.E.2d 201 (1980) (same,
applying Georgia law), with Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Fuels, Inc. (In re Dixie Fuels, Inc.), 48 B.R.
514, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (question of fact, applying Alabama law). Even if “sufficiency” is a
question of fact, as noted above, all parties have conceded no material factual dispute exists and the Court
may render judgment based solely on the documentary evidence adduced. Even were that not the case, (and
(continued...)

1 Demeter Note are secured by properly perfected unavoidable security interests in Plaintiffs' Christmas trees
2 and the proceeds thereof.¹⁶ Under FRCP 54(b) (made applicable by FRBP 7054(a)), the Court finds no just
3 reason for delay in entering judgment. Harvest's counsel is to prepare one order denying Plaintiff's motion
4 for summary judgment and granting both cross motions for summary judgment, and one judgment covering
5 both Harvest and Demeter, consistent with the above. Entitlement to attorney's fees and costs shall be
6 determined in supplemental proceedings consistent with LBRs 7054-1 and 9021-1(c). The above constitute
7 the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under FRCP 52(a), made applicable to this proceeding
8 under FRBP 7052. They shall not be separately stated.

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10 
11 THOMAS M. RENN
12 Bankruptcy Judge
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22 ¹⁵(...continued)

23 “sufficiency” was a question of fact), the Court concludes, giving Plaintiffs all reasonable inferences, that
24 there is no genuine dispute as to whether the descriptions are sufficient (that is, no reasonable jury could find
for Plaintiffs on the evidence adduced on summary judgment).

25 ¹⁶As Demeter noted at oral argument, because it is junior to Harvest and because Harvest is
26 undersecured based on the Court's prior valuation of its collateral, Demeter's interest in the Christmas trees
may have no value, particularly if a “cram down” plan is eventually confirmed.