1 11 USC §1325(b)(2)(A) Disposable income 2 Dependent 3 697-61826-fra13 In re Steven Young 12/10/97 4 FRA Unpub. 5 The Debtor owns and shares his house with a co-tenant, whom the Debtor described as a "domestic partner." The partner is a 6 full-time student and works only occasionally. In computing 7 disposable income to determine the amount of his plan payment, the Debtor deducted the entire amount of his house payment as 8 well as the amount spent for food, medical, utilities, etc. for the household. A creditor objected on the ground that only the 9 expenditures relating to the Debtor himself could be used to calculate disposable income. The creditor also objected to several expenses with had increased substantially in the ten 10 weeks between the time the petition was filed and the date of 11 conversion to Chapter 13. 12 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) defines disposable income as income received by the debtor which is not reasonably necessary to be 13 expended for the support "of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." No definition is given for "dependent." The court 14 examined definitions made by other courts and held that for purposes of § 1325, a dependent is "an individual whom the debtor 15 has a legal duty to support, or who is actually and reasonably dependent on the debtor." 16 Applying its definition to the facts of the case, the court 17 held that the Debtor's partner is not a dependent. The Debtor has no legal duty to support the partner. Further, the partner 18 is an adult who is capable of working. The debtor did not meet his burden of proving dependency. The debtor also failed to 19 prove the reasonableness of the other expenditures objected to. Confirmation of the plan was denied and debtor was ordered to 20 submit a modified plan in which disposable income is calculated using only those expenditures reasonably necessary for the 21 debtor's support. 22 23 24 25 E97-22(8) 26

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8	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
9	DISTRICT OF OREGON
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12	IN RE)) Case No. 697-61826-fra13
13	STEVEN L. YOUNG,
14	Debtor.) MEMORANDUM OPINION
15	An unsecured creditor, Timberline Community Bank, has
16	objected to the Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan of Reorganization on the
17	ground that he has not committed all of his disposable income to
18	the Plan as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A). For the
19	reasons that follow, confirmation of the Debtor's Plan is denied.
20	BACKGROUND
21	The debtor owns his house with a co-tenant "not as joint
22	tenants, but with right of survivorship." This form of ownership
23 24	is used in an attempt to create a type of joint tenancy in real
24 25	property as a result of the Oregon legislature having abolished
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20	Momorrandum Opinion - 2
	Memorandum Opinion - 2

joint tenancies in real property.¹ In testimony, it was 1 determined that the co-tenant is an adult, is not employed, and 2 attends school full time. The Debtor originally filed a Chapter 3 7 petition, but converted to Chapter 13 about 21/2 months later. He 4 5 pays most, if not all, of the monthly household expenses including the mortgage payment, home maintenance and insurance 6 7 costs, and heat and utility payments. In determining the amount of disposable income he has available to make plan payments, the 8 9 Debtor appears to have deducted the full amount of these 10 payments.² Timberline argues that the Debtor's co-tenant is responsible for ½ of these costs and the Debtor cannot include 11 12 the full amount on Schedule J, the schedule listing current expenditures of the debtor. Additionally, Timberline objects to 13 14 certain claimed expenditures that increased without explanation 15 from the Schedule J filed with the Chapter 7 petition to the 16 Schedule J filed when the case was converted, including costs for 17 telephone, food, medical and dental, and transportation.

DISCUSSION

A. Disposable Income Test

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(b) (1) If the trustee or the holder of an

¹With the abolition of joint tenancies, ownership of real property in Oregon is limited to tenancy in common, life estate, and, for a married couple, tenancy by the entirety.

²With the exception of the mortgage payment. Debtor's original Schedule J filed with his Chapter 7 petition listed a mortgage payment of \$858. The Schedule J filed when the case was converted to Chapter 13 and from which the monthly payment was calculated shows a monthly mortgage payment of \$429, one-half of the total payment.

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1	allowed unsecured claim objects to the
2	confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan—
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4	(A) the value of the property to be
5	distributed under the plan on account of such
6	claim is not less than the amount of such claim;
7	or
8	(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's
9	projected disposable income to be received in
10	the three-year period beginning on the date
11	that the first payment is due under the plan will
12	be applied to make payments under the plan.
13	(2) For purposes of this
14	subsection, "disposable income" means income which is <u>of the</u>
15	<u>debtor</u> received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary
16	to be expended-
17	(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor
18	or a dependent of the debtor; and
19	(B) if the debtor is
20	engaged in business, for the payment of
21	expenditures necessary for the continuation,
22	preservation, and operation of such
23	business.
24	B. <u>Meaning of "Dependent</u> "
25	Under the disposable income test shown above, an expenditure
26	can be used to calculate disposable income only if it is
	Memorandum Opinion - 4

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reasonably necessary for the maintenance and support of the 1 debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or it is a necessary 2 business expense. The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not define 3 the term "dependent." Various courts have grappled with this 4 5 issue and have noted that Congress has defined the term in a number of non-bankruptcy contexts. See Leslie Womack Real 6 7 Estate, Inc. v. Dunbar (In re Dunbar), 99 B.R. 320, 324 (Bankr. M.D. Louisana 1989). The court in Dunbar, in noting that 8 9 Congress specifically defines the term when it is used in a 10 particular manner, stated the canon of statutory construction 11 that, "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 12 taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Id 13 (quoting <u>Perrin v. United States</u>, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Usina 14 this approach, the <u>Dunbar</u> court adopted the meaning for dependent 15 as a "person who reasonably relies on the debtor for support and 16 whom the debtor has reason to and does support financially." Id. 17 Other bankruptcy courts have adopted this or similar definitions. 18 See In re Rigdon, 133 B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991); In re 19 Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993). In Gonzales, the court added the additional "clarification" that the court 20 21 must determine "whether it is reasonable under the circumstances 22 for the court to permit the debtor to undertake the obligation of 23 supporting the would-be dependent." Gonzales at 609. Determining 24 the reasonableness of the obligation for support would be 25 dependent on a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances of each 26 case.

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The <u>Gonzales</u> court noted that the definition adopted by it and other courts is consistent with what appears to be the majority view. For purposes of defining the term "dependent" in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b), I will adopt the definition s outlined above.

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C. <u>Is Debtor's Co-Tenant a Dependent</u>

7 The Dunbar court listed several relevant questions in an 8 analysis of dependency, including the length of time the claimed 9 dependent has resided in the household, the reason the claimed 10 dependent is residing in the household, and whether the dependent is in fact necessitous. Dunbar at 326 n. 3. The Debtor has the 11 12 burden of proof on all matters of confirmation, including § 13 1325(b). See In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 14 1986). Thus, in order to claim expenditures for items of support 15 which would ordinarily be the responsibility of the Debtor's cotenant, Mr. Hebner, the Debtor must offer sufficient evidence to 16 17 convince the Court that Mr. Hebner is and should be considered a 18 dependent for purposes of § 1325(b)(2). The Debtor has not met 19 his burden in that regard. Mr. Hebner is an adult, apparently 20 capable of working, who attends school full time. No compelling 21 reasons were given as to why he should be considered a dependent of the Debtor and the Debtor's unsecured creditors made to 22 23 subsidize Mr. Hebner's education. Accordingly, I hold that for 24 purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), Mr. Hebner cannot be 25 categorized as a dependent of the Debtor and Schedule J expenses 26 cannot include any expenditures made by the Debtor for the Memorandum Opinion - 6

1 support and maintenance of Mr. Hebner.

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D. <u>Reasonableness of Other Expenditures</u>

3 Disposable income is defined as income less expenditures reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor 4 or a dependent of the debtor. § 1325(b)(2). The Code does not 5 define what constitutes reasonably necessary expenditures for 6 maintenance or support, although it would not include 7 expenditures for the acquisition of luxury goods or services. 8 9 One definition that has been used for "reasonably necessary" is 10 based on a standard of "adequacy, supporting the basic needs 'not 11 related to [the debtor's] former status in society or the 12 lifestyle to which he is accustomed." In re Cardillo, 170 B.R. 13 490, 491 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1994) (citing In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 14 157 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1997). It is not necessary that the debtor 15 prove that every item of expense is reasonably necessary, but when a creditor objects to a particular item, the debtor must 16 address the issue. In re Selden, 116 B.R. 232 (Bankr. D. Or. 17 18 1990), <u>aff'd</u>, 121 B.R. 59 (D. Or. 1990). As noted previously, 19 the burden of proof is on the debtor with regard to § 1325; the 20 debtor must therefore offer sufficient evidence to prove the 21 reasonableness of those expenditures objected to. See In re 22 Chinichian, 784 F.2d at 1444.

Timberline objected to a number of expenditures on Schedule J as being excessive, most of which increased substantially in the 2½ months between the time that the bankruptcy petition was first filed and the time of the conversion to Chapter 13. The Memorandum Opinion - 7 1 burden is on the Debtor to justify the reasonableness of those 2 expenditures. [DID THE DEBTOR OFFER ANY EXPLANATION FOR SUCH 3 THINGS AS THE JUMP IN FOOD AND MEDICAL AND DENTAL, OR WERE THEY 4 INCREASED TO ACCOUNT FOR EXPENDITURES MADE ON BEHALF OF THE CO-5 TENANT?]

CONCLUSION

7 Only those expenses reasonably necessary for the maintenance 8 or support of the Debtor may be used in calculating disposable 9 income for purposes of § 1325(b), as Mr. Hebner does not qualify 10 as a dependent under that section. Consequently, expenditures on 11 Schedule J will have to be reduced to eliminate those relating to 12 Mr. Hebner. A modified Plan should be filed within 21 days in 13 which disposable income is calculated using only expenditures on 14 Schedule J which are reasonably necessary for the maintenance or 15 support of the Debtor. An order consistent with this opinion 16 will be entered.

> FRANK R. ALLEY, III Bankruptcy Judge

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